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COMMENT

MONTANA'S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT:
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DENYING A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Lisa M. Polk*

I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, Montana voters enacted Constitutional
Initiative 96 ("CI-96") an amendment to the State Constitution
defining marriage as a union strictly between a man and a
woman. 1 In so doing, proponents of the bill successfully
preempted a potential state constitutional challenge to
2
Montana's statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage.
Although CI-96, also known as the "Marriage Amendment,"

* University of Montana School of Law, class of 2005. I would like to thank my peers on
the Montana Law Review for their guidance and support. Several additional individuals
provided me with invaluable guidance in writing this comment. I am particularly
indebted to Brian Budds, Professor J. Martin Burke, J. Wayne Capp, Quinn Emett,
Professor Thomas P. Huff, Professor Elizabeth L. Griffing, Jennifer S. Hendricks,
Thomas W. Korver, and Matthew C. Thuesen. I also thank my first writing teacher and
mother, Bonnie W. Polk, for her ceaseless support. Finally, I am grateful to my father,
John. W. Polk, for reading innumerable drafts of this comment and more importantly, for
inspiring me every day with his intelligence, curiosity and reason.
1. MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
2. The Montana leeslature enacted a statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage
in 1997, codified in MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d) (2003).
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makes a potential state constitutional challenge to the
prohibition on same-sex marriage more difficult, it does not
prevent such a challenge on federal grounds. 3
Drawing from United States Supreme Court case law, this
comment argues that Montana's Marriage Amendment is
patently unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 4 Over the last half
century, the Court has consistently held that marriage is a
fundamental right protected under the Federal Constitution.
Importantly, the Court interprets the modern institution of
marriage as encapsulating elements that can apply to same-sex
relationships.
The Court's decisions also construe the
Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing lesbians and gays the
same due process liberty interests and equal protection rights as
heterosexuals. Montana cannot deprive lesbians and gays the
right to marry unless there is a compelling state interest, or at
the very least, a rationale reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest. There is no compelling state interest and no
reasonable rationale for denying same-sex couples the right to
marry under Montana's Marriage Amendment.
Part II of this comment discusses the Massachusetts case
Goodridge v. Department of Health5 and Montana's subsequent
enactment of CI-96. Part III chronologically discusses cases in
which the United States Supreme Court held marriage is a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment, protected
by the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, or
both. Part IV argues that the traditional definition of marriage
does not foreclose the lesbian and gay marriage debate because
modern marriage embodies elements applicable to same-sex
relationships. Part V examines Lawrence v. Texas6 and its
analysis of liberty under the Due Process Clause. Part VI
analyzes Romer v. Evans,7 where the Court held that the Equal

3. The Montana Supreme Court has overruled constitutional amendments on
procedural grounds, but never on substantive grounds. See Cole v. State ex rel. Brown,
2002 MT 32, 308 Mont. 265, 42 P.3d 760 (state senators and individual electors
chanllenged the process by which voters approved term limits in the 1992 election); and
Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325 (the court
held that constitutional amendments must be voted on separately). Query: Would it be
possible to find the Marriage Amendment unconstitutional because the fundamental
rights in Article II would trump a miscellaneous provision found in Article XIII?
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment invalidated a
Colorado voter initiative with a discriminatory effect on
lesbians, gays or bisexuals. Finally, Part VII applies these
holdings to Montana's Marriage Amendment and concludes that
it violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and should therefore be repealed.
II. GOODRIDGEAND MONTANA'S RESPONSE
A. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
In Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held unconstitutional a statutory prohibition on same-sex
marriage based on numerous provisions in the state
constitution.8 The court reasoned that "[m]arriage is a vital
social institution . . . [that] brings stability to our society ...
[and] provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social
benefits." 9 Based on this understanding of marriage, the court
held that the Massachusetts Constitution does not permit the
Commonwealth to deny the protections, benefits, and obligations
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex
who wish to marry. 10 The Massachusetts court emphasized that
its decision was grounded in the state constitution and not the
whims of social opinion: "Our concern is with the Massachusetts
Constitution as a charter of governance for every person
properly within its reach."1 1 Citing the United States Supreme
Court's language in Lawrence, the court concluded that its
"obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
12
moral code."
In Goodridge, the court focused on the "individual liberty
and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution
[that] protect both 'freedom from' unwarranted government
intrusion into protected spheres of life and 'freedom to' partake

8. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 951, nn.7-8. "The plaintiffs alleged violation of the
laws of the Commonwealth, including but not limited to their rights under arts. 1, 6, 7,
10, 12, and 16, and Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution." Id. at
950.
9. Id. at 948.
10. Id. at 969.
ii.
id. at 948.
12. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))).
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in benefits created by the State for the common good.' 3 In other
words, the Goodridge court approached the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage under both due process and equal protection
analyses. 14 The court held that gays and lesbians have the same
due process and equal protection rights as heterosexuals,
therefore, the same liberty interests and the same marriage
rights enjoyed by everyone else. 15 Using rational basis review,
the court held that the government's three reasons for16
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying had no merit.
Specifically, prohibiting same-sex marriage does not further
procreation, does not ensure the optimal setting for child rearing
and does not preserve financial resources.' 7
B. ConstitutionalInitiative 96- Montana'sMarriage
Amendment
In response to Goodridge, and fueled by a fear of same-sex
marriage, thirteen states in 2004 amended their constitutions to
8
define marriage as a union only between a man and a woman.'
Montana voters passed CI-96 amending the Montana
Constitution to provide that "only a marriage between one man
and one woman shall be valid or recognized as marriage in this
state." 9 This amendment, written into Article XIII of the
Montana Constitution, effectively prohibits marriages between
persons of the same sex. In addition to Montana, the other
states to pass such constitutional amendments are Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah. 20 Prior to
2004, Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada already had such

13. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 953.
15. Id. at 968.
16. Id. at 961. "For due process claims, rational basis analysis requires that
statutes bear a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some
other phase of the general welfare. For equal protection challenges, the rational basis
test requires that 'an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification
would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class."' Id. at 960 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 961-64.
18. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the
U.S. (Feb. 1, 2005) at http://www.thetaskforce.org/community/marriagecenter.cfm (click
on PDF file under 'Marriage Map - post Nov. 2, 2004 - February 1, 2005").
19. MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
20. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, supra note 18.
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amendments. 2 1
Like most states, Montana has had a statutory prohibition
on same-sex marriage in its code for many years; in Montana's

case, since

1997.22

This law effectively kept lesbian and gay

couples from marrying.
However, the decision by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge prompted
opponents of same-sex marriage around the country, including
in Montana, to have concerns about the constitutionality of their
own state bans.
Jeff Laszloffy, a Republican state
representative from Laurel, Montana and the Executive Director
of the Montana Family Foundation, spearheaded the movement
to place the initiative on the 2004 ballot. The Montana Family
Foundation urged individuals and churches to support CI-96 by
providing yard signs obtainable through its website and
encouraging individuals and churches to pay for advertisements
23
in local newspapers.
According to Laszloffy, the initiative responded to gay and
lesbian activism across the country. Prior to the election,
Laszloffy argued that "it's the gay community that is on the
offensive. All of the amendments are to stop a movement that
already exists." 24 Laszloffy asserted that he wrote CI-96 because
he knew the issue would come before Montana courts and he
"wanted to give judges a clear message on how the people of
Montana want them to respond." 25 In other words, Laszloffy
anticipated that a court might hold Montana's statutory
prohibition on marriage unconstitutional. In an attempt to
preempt the obvious legal battle ahead, he drafted CI-96 and
asked the people of Montana to amend the state constitution.
Montana voters complied, and in so doing, enacted an
amendment that denies lesbian and gay couples the

21. Id.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(l)(d) (2003).
The states with statutory
prohibitions as of February 2005 include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, supra note 18.
23. Montana Human Rights Network, Waging a Racist Campaign: The National
Alliance Targets Montana, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK NEWS 6 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.mhrn.org/website.pdf.
24.
Julie Sparrow Carson, Conflicted Agendas, ivhssOuLA iNDE ENDENT, Oct. 14,
2004, available at http://www.missoulanews.com/News/News.asp?no=4390.
25. Id.
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fundamental right to marry in violation of both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of
26
the United States Constitution.
III. MARRIAGE IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court declared the
importance of marriage in Skinner v. Oklahoma.27 In that case,
the Court overturned an Oklahoma law permitting sterilization
of certain criminals, while simultaneously declaring "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental." 28 Since Skinner, the Court
has continuously held that marriage is a fundamental right that
may be deprived only if the government has a compelling
29
purpose.
In analyzing whether a person has the right to marry under
the Federal Constitution, the Court has used the Due Process
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, or a combination of both.
According to constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinksy, the
Court often reaches the same result through either clause-the
difference has to do with the phrasing of the constitutional
argument. 30 Under due process, the issue is whether a sufficient
purpose justifies the government's interference with a
fundamental right, while under equal protection, the issue is
whether a sufficient purpose justifies the government
discriminating as to who can exercise the right. 3 1 The Court has
reaffirmed marriage as a fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment in several cases, including Loving v.
Virginia,32 Boddie v. Connecticut,33 Zablocki v. Redhail,34 and
35
Turner v. Safely.

26.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 4 (2d ed. 2002) ("Practically, the effect of the Supremacy
Clause is that state and local laws are deemed preempted if they conflict with federal
law.").
27. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
28. Id. at 541.
29. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399 (1923) where the Court held prior to
Skinner that liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
includes "the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up
children."
30. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 763.
31. Id.
32. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
34. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
35. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Multiple cases discuss the importance of marriage,
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A. Loving v. Virginia
In 1967, Loving held unconstitutional Virginia's statutory
ban on mixed race marriages based on both the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 In
June of 1958, Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Jeter, a
black woman, both Virginia residents, were married in the
District of Columbia. 3 7 The couple subsequently moved to
Caroline County, Virginia.3 8 By October 1958, they faced arrest
for violating the State's ban on interracial marriages. 39 Virginia
convicted the Lovings under a comprehensive statutory scheme
aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The
first of the two statutes explained that "any white person and
colored person" who left Virginia to marry and then returned
would be punished under the law.40 The second statute defined
miscegenation as a felony punishable "by confinement in the
41
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years."
In addition, the Virginia statutory scheme included a provision
that all marriages between "a white person and a colored
42
person" are automatically void without any judicial proceeding.
After the Lovings pled guilty to the charges, the Virginia

including, but not limited to the following: Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (1965) ("Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."); Casey,
505 U.S. at 847-48, 859 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle
before. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage
was illegal in most States in the 19th Century, but the Court was no doubt correct in
finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia .... While the
outer limits of this aspect of [protected liberty] have not been marked by the Court, it is
clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified
government interference are personal decisions relating to marriage .... ") (alterations
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997) ('The Due Process Clause ... protect[s] certain fundamental
rights and 'personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education,' and ... many of those rights and liberties
'involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."')
(third alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
36. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 4.
40.
41. Id.
42. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4.
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trial court sentenced them to a year in jail, but told the couple
the sentence would be suspended if they left Virginia and never
returned together for a period of twenty-five years. 43 In an
opinion with sentiments strikingly familiar to today's arguments
endorsing a ban on same-sex marriage, the trial judge in Loving
stated:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
the races shows that
such marriages. The fact that he separated
44
he did not intend for the races to mix.

In response to the lower court's ruling, the Lovings appealed
their convictions on the ground that Virginia's antimiscegenation laws violated the Federal Constitution. 45 The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions, and the
Lovings appealed their case to the United States Supreme
46
Court.
In 1967, the year Loving was decided, sixteen states had
statutory prohibitions on interracial marriage.4 7 In addressing
the constitutionality of Virginia's statutory ban on interracial
marriages, the Court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, which state in
pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
48
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In defending its statutory scheme, Virginia set forth a twofold argument. First, that with regard to equal protection, the
miscegenation laws treated both blacks and whites as equals
because both participants received punishment equally. 49 In
backing this point, the State argued that during the ratification
process of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the ThirtyNinth Congress and state legislatures asserted that penal laws
43. Id. at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. Id. at 6, n.5. The sixteen states with statutory prohibitions on interracial
marriage when Loving was decided included: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Montana was one of the fourteen
states to repeal its ban on interracial marriage in the fifteen years prior to Loving. The
other states included: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
48. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2, n.1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
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satisfied equal protection if they similarly punished white and
black participants. 50 Secondly, Virginia argued that its antimiscegenation laws were rational because "the scientific
evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court
should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting
51
its policy of discouraging interracial marriages."
The Court summarily rejected both arguments. Writing for
a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren held the "racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to
protect the 'integrity' of all races." 52 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court first addressed the equal protection analysis. "[T]he
Equal Protection Clause," Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' and, if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary
to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
53
independent of the racial discrimination."
The Court concluded that no legitimate purpose justified the
statutory classifications and that racial discrimination marked
the sole purpose behind the laws. 54 The Chief Justice noted that
Virginia, dating back to the Racial Integrity Act of 1924,
prohibited whites from marrying any nonwhite-with the
exception of Pocahontas's descendants-but permitted nonwhites to intermarry without statutory interference. 55 This
prohibition, Chief Justice Warren held, indicated that Virginia
designed the statutes to maintain white supremacy. 56 As such,
the Court held: "There can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
57
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."
In addition to violating equal protection, the Court held that
the anti-miscegenation statutes violated the Due Process Clause
by "depriv[ing] all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law."5 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12, n.11.
Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
Id.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 5, n.4.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

9

414

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Vol. 66

the importance of marriage as "one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."59 "The
freedom to marry," the Court noted, "has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." 60 Chief Justice Warren ended
the Loving opinion by declaring: "Under our Constitution, the
freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides
61
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
B. Boddie v. Connecticut
Four years after Loving, the Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut law requiring all persons seeking a divorce to pay
$60 to cover filing fees and service of process violated the Due
Process Clause. 62 The appellants, welfare recipients residing in
Connecticut, brought a class action in federal court after the
clerk of court informed them that their divorce paperwork would
not be accepted unless they paid the required costs. 63 The
appellants argued that the filing costs essentially barred
indigent citizens from obtaining a divorce, which in turn
prohibited these same people from entering into a new
64
marriage.
Writing for the Court, the second Justice Harlan reaffirmed
Skinner's and Loving's holdings that marriage is a fundamental
right.65 In holding that the Connecticut law violated due
process, the Court reasoned that a divorce is a necessary
precondition to remarrying. 66 If the judicial process prevents
indigents from divorcing because they cannot afford filing fees, it
effectively prohibits the fundamental right to marry to these
persons. The Court held that the Due Process Clause protects
the right to judicial process when access to the courts affects a
"fundamental human relationship" such as marriage. 67 To
deprive a person of judicial process essential to obtaining a
divorce, and in turn marriage, Connecticut had to show that a

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
Id.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372-74.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 376, 383.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383.
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necessary connection existed between the statute's requirements
that a person pay money to file for a divorce and the State's
68
reasons for such a requirement.
In defending its statute, Connecticut argued that the
divorce fee substantially prevented frivolous litigation, that the
State rationally used the divorce fee and processed court costs to
scarce resources, and that the law reasonably balanced the
defendant's right to notice and the plaintiffs right to access. 69
The Court held that none of the State's arguments sufficiently
70
overrode a person's interest in having access to a divorce.
Specifically, the Court determined that a litigant's assets are not
necessarily connected to the seriousness of his or her motives for
filing for a divorce. 7 1 In addition, courts could conserve time and
prevent frivolous litigation by other means, such as penalties for
false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process. 72 As for service costs, reliable
alternatives existed to service by a State-paid sheriff-such as
postal mail.73 Thus, the Court held that Connecticut could not
constitutionally block an indigent's access to the judicial process
by requiring a fee. Justice Harlan concluded:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this
relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying,
to individuals
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts
74
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.
In separate concurring opinions, both Justice Douglas and
Justice Brennan stated they would have used an equal
protection analysis in determining Connecticut's statute
Justice Douglas reasoned that because
unconstitutional.
Connecticut required married couples to pay money to divorce,
the more affluent could afford the legal process, but indigents
could not. 75 As a result, wealth became the basis for denying
divorce, and in some cases, for granting marriage. 76 Justice
Douglas concluded that [a]ffluence does not pass muster under
68.

Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

74.

Boddie. 401 U.S. at 374.

75.
76.

Id. at 384 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring).

at 381-83.
at 381.
at 381-82.
at 382.
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the Equal Protection Clause for determining who must remain
married and who shall be allowed to separate. 77 Similarly,
Justice Brennan asserted that in addition to due process, the
"case present[ed] a classic problem of equal protection of the
laws."7 8 Equal justice under the law applies "to rich and poor
alike . . . . [The courts] fail to perform their function in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause if they shut their
79
doors to indigent plaintiffs altogether."
Importantly, the Boddie decision centered on the fact that
marriage-a fundamental right-was at stake.8 0 The Court held
that because states have a monopoly on dissolving this
fundamental right, Connecticut deprived the poor of liberty
without due process of law by not waiving divorce filing fees for
the indigent. 8 '
C. Zablocki v. Redhail
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the question before the Court
involved the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute prohibiting
a resident from marrying if he or she had an obligation to pay
for a minor child not in his or her custody.8 2 The law required a
resident to prove compliance with child support obligations, as
well as demonstrate that the child covered by the support
obligation was not and would not become a public charge in the
future.8 3 In 1974, Wisconsin denied Roger Redhail a marriage
application because he had not paid child support to his
illegitimate child who had become a charge of the State on
welfare benefits.8 4 The complaint alleged that Redhail expected
a child with another woman he wished to marry and wanted the
85
union legitimized before the birth.
The Court held the Wisconsin law unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.8 6 Writing for a divided Court, Justice
Marshall referenced Loving as the leading case on the right to
77. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996).
81. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 'TundamentalRight" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1946-47 (2004).
82. 434 U.S. at 375.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 378.
85. Id. at 379.
86. Id. at 382.
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marry.8 7 Since the Wisconsin law did not involve a suspect
classification comparable to the race-based classification in
Loving, the Court justified applying strict scrutiny based solely
on the law's restriction of the right to marry: "Although Loving
arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and
subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to
88
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."
Justice Marshall reiterated the Court's language in Loving: "The
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."8 9 Justice Marshall emphasized the Court's deference
to the fundamental right to marry by comparing the Court's
Boddie holding regarding divorce fees to its subsequent decision
in United States v. Kras in which it held "that filing fees in
bankruptcy actions did not deprive indigents of due process or
The Court distinguished the cases by
equal protection." 90
stating: "The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie
touched directly . . . on the marital relationship and on the
associational interests that surround the establishment and
dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have
recognized the fundamental
importance of these interests under
91
our Constitution.
The Wisconsin statute prohibited people from marrying who
were unable to pay child support obligations or prove their
children would not become charges of the State. 92 Applying
strict scrutiny under an equal protection analysis, the Court
held that the statute's interference with the right to marry
required Wisconsin to show that sufficiently important state
interests supported the law and that it was "closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests." 93 In defending its provision,
Wisconsin made two arguments. First, the requirement that
out-of-compliance parents must receive permission to marry
allowed for counseling to be given to these individuals regarding
their child support obligations; second, the welfare of the

87.
88.

Id. at 383.
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 128 (The Free

Press 1996).
89. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
90. Id. at 385, n.10.
91. Id. (quoting Kras, 409 U.S. at 444) (alterntian in orinn-i).
92. Id. at 387.
93. Id. at 388.
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children not in custody would be protected. 94 Justice Marshall
rejected the first argument on the ground that the statute did
not mandate or provide any counseling whatsoever, and rejected
the second argument because the State provided no evidence
that children not in custody actually received money to protect
them.9 5 To the contrary, Justice Marshall noted that preventing
this group of people from marrying prevented financial stability
that often comes with marriage and caused more out-of-wedlock
children. 96 Because Wisconsin did not provide valid justification
97
for the law, the Court held the statute unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court stressed that the principle of Loving
is not limited to race discrimination, but applies more broadly to
other types of discrimination affecting the fundamental right to
marry. 98 Zablocki established that a state law placing a direct
legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married
denies equal protection of the laws to those persons, unless the
government can support the law with sufficiently important
state interests and closely tailors it to effectuate only those
interests .99
D. Turner v. Safley
In Turner v. Safley, the Court once again upheld the
importance of marriage, particularly for the emotional, spiritual
and financial benefits it provides couples. 10 0 In Turner, the
Court analyzed the Missouri Division of Corrections' policy of
regulating prison marriages by prohibiting an inmate from
marrying unless the prison superintendent found a compelling
reason-generally pregnancy or the birth of a child-to grant
the right. 10 1
The regulation prohibited marriages between
inmates, as well as between inmates and civilians. 0 2 The
respondents brought a class action for injunctive relief and
damages,
arguing that the regulation violated their

94. Id.
95. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-89.
96. Id. at 390.
97. Id. at 390-91.
98. Id. at 384.
99. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 128 (citing Zablocki at 388).
100.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
101. Id. at 82. The Court also addressed the constitutionality of prison regulations
related to inmate correspondences. Id. at 81-82.
102. Id. at 97.
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constitutional rights. 103
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor first addressed the
principles that frame the analysis of prisoners' constitutional
claims: "It is settled that a prison inmate 'retains those
[constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system."' 10 4 The prison conceded that marriage is a
fundamental right under Zablocki and Loving, but argued that
the fundamental right to marry did not apply in a prison
forum. 10 5 The Court disagreed, holding that although a prison
setting provides obvious restrictions on marriage, "important
attributes of marriage remain" that provide sufficient reasons to
constitutionally protect the marital relationship in the prison
06
context.1
First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional
support and public commitment. These elements are an important
and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In addition,
many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual
significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as
well as an expression of personal dedication. Third, most inmates
eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and
therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation
that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally, marital
status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits
(e.g., Social Security benefits), property benefits (e.g., tenancy by
benefits
the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible
07
(e.g., legitimation of children born out of wedlock). 1

Justice O'Connor concluded that these marriage elements
require that the fundamental right to marry apply to
prisoners. 08
In balancing prisoners' fundamental right to marry versus
the warden's need to regulate inmates, the Court did not
exclusively rely on equal protection arguments or traditional
strict scrutiny analysis of a fundamental right under due
process. Instead, the Court appeared to apply due process
analysis of a fundamental right using rational basis review:
"when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional

103.
104.
105.
1o.
107.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 84, 95 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.
IdN.
Id. at 95-96.

108.

Id. at 96.
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rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."'10 9 The Court determined that
the prison's
reasons for
the regulation-safety
and
rehabilitation-were
insufficient. 110
Although legitimate
security concerns surely required reasonable restrictions, the
Court held that the regulation served as an "exaggerated
response" to such needs: "There are obvious, easy alternatives to
the Missouri regulation that accommodate the right to marry
while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit of security
objectives." '
The Turner analysis provides important reasons for why the
Court protects marriage as a fundamental right. Significantly,
the elements elucidated in Justice O'Connor's opinion did not
include procreation or child-rearing." 2 Instead, the Court held
that the fundamental right to marry is constitutionally
protected because marriage is a statement by two people to each
other and the world of their interpersonal commitment,
emotional
companionship,
and spiritual
and physical
fulfillment." 3 Since these aspects of marriage are unaffected by
prisoner status, the Court held unconstitutional the warden's
prohibition on inmates marrying. 1 4
IV. MARRIAGE ELEMENTS APPLY TO SAME-SEX
RELATIONSHIPS
Opponents of same-sex marriage argue that the
fundamental right analysis does not apply to same-sex couples
because marriage, by definition, only applies to unions between
opposite-sex persons." 5 This semantics-based argument simply
does not foreclose the constitutional issue. As Professor William
Eskridge, Jr. notes, standard dictionaries define marriage as the
"legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife,"
but some modern dictionaries describe marriage more
generically as 'an intimate or close union."1" 6 Black's Law
109. Id. at 87, 89.
110. Id. at 97.
111. Turner, 482 U.S. at 97-98.
112. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 129; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 31-32,
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (2002 VVL 32364782).
113. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96; see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 31-32, Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (2002 WL 32364782).
114. Thrner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
115. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 89.
116. Id.
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Dictionary includes a definition of same-sex marriage as "the
ceremonial union of two people of the same sex; a marriage or
117
marriage-like relationship between two women or two men."
Members of the lesbian and gay community have used the word
"marriage" to apply to their relationships. 118 Congress clearly
recognized this fact when, during the codification of the ban on
gays in the military, it included a provision excluding people in
homosexual marriages. 119 Most significantly, the fact that
fifteen states have gone to the extraordinary trouble to amend
their constitutions to define marriage as a union between a man
0
and a woman, indicates the term's definitional elasticity.12
Importantly, the Court's justification for protecting the
fundamental right status of marriage does not turn on a
definition or description exclusive to opposite-sex couples. The
Court held in Turner that marriage is fundamental to society
because of the commitment it recognizes. 121 Turner describes
marriage elements that are wholly unrelated to heterosexuality.
The Turner reasoning marked a significant shift from the
in Loving that marriage furthers
Court's earlier emphasis
"existence and survival.' 1 22 Even prior to Loving, however, the
Court emphasized in Griswold v. Connecticut the importance of
marriage in non-procreative terms: 'Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects."'123 Since Griswold held that the government cannot

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 994 (8th ed. 2004). In addition, Dictionary.com lists
117.
several definitions of marriage, including "[a] union between two persons having the
customary but usually not the legal force of marriage: a same-sex marriage," at
http://dictiontary.reference.com/search?q=marriage.
118. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 89.
119. Id.
120. See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, supra note 18.
121. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96.
122. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; see also supra text accompanying note 59. This shift
makes sense in light of American society's evolution from agrarian, where procreation is
important to survival, to urban, where personal and interpersonal fulfillment are more
important. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 130.
123. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48, 859 ("[lt is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was iilla iI ,llub
States in the 19th Century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an
aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the
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impose procreation on couples, it is unsurprising that Justice
Douglas's description of marriage did not mention procreating or
child rearing as a necessary component of marriage.
Griswold portrays marriage as a hopefully enduring,
intimate relationship that promotes harmonious living-a set of
goals certainly attainable by same-sex couples. Today, not all
people marry for romantic love, but most would agree that
affection and respect are crucial aspects of a successful
marriage. 124 Lesbians and gays have the same human ability as
heterosexuals to create relationships around love, commitment,
respect and loyalty. 125 Like heterosexuals, lesbians and gays
benefit from the valuable support shared in caring, loving and
intimate relationships. 12 6 Lesbians and gays raise happy,
healthy and well-adjusted children with equal parenting skills
to heterosexuals. 127 Given that same-sex couples are capable of
attaining the attributes associated with America's modern,
romantic, companionate marriage, the definitional argument
that marriage only applies to opposite-sex couples falls apart.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized the
failure of the definitional argument by reasoning in Goodridge
that civil marriage does not require procreation because the
marriage licensing laws do not question applicants on their
ability or intention to conceive children.128 "Fertility is not a
condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. 1 29 The
Goodridge court described marriage as "a vital social institution
...
. [that] brings stability to our society [and] provides an

Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia ....
While the outer limits of this aspect of
[protected liberty] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are
personal decisions relating to marriage.
...) (citations and quotations omitted);
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726 ("the Due Process Clause ... protect[s] certain fundamental
rights and 'personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education,' and . . . many of those rights and liberties
'involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."')
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
124. Adam Haslett, Love Supreme: Gay Nuptials and the Marking of Modern
Marriage,THE NEW YORKER, May 31, 2004, at 76.

125. Carlos A. Ball, Marriage, Same-Gender Relationships, and Human Needs and
Capabilities, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 138 (Lynn D. Wardle et al.
eds., 2003).
126. Id. at 139.
127. Nancy D. Polikoff, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: THE LAST THIRTY YEARS, 66
Mont. L. Rev. 55 (2005).
128. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.
129. Id.
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abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits."' 3 0 The court
concluded that while "perhaps most, married couples have
children together (assisted or unassisted), it is the exclusive and
permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of
civil marriage."'131 Importantly, if the court had held otherwise,
Massachusetts would potentially have a legal claim to prohibit
132
persons from marrying who are sterile, impotent or aged.
Furthermore, relying on a traditional understanding of
marriage as only between a man and a woman fails to recognize
that marriage is an evolving institution, and like many
institutions, generational changes result in new interpretations
of the standard. 33 European marriage was once a contract
between families to protect property or forge political
alliances. 3 4 A century ago, the woman's role in a traditional
American marriage was strictly domestic, as evidenced by the
Court's 1873 decision to refuse Myra Bradwell admission to the
State Bar of Illinois. 35 In that case, Justice Bradley wrote in a
concurring opinion: "The constitution of the family organization,
which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
136
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood."'
Modern times, however, render Justice Bradley's interpretation
of a wife's role obsolete. The expansion of women's employment
outside the home sparked the Court to move toward gender
equality in its decisions. 137 As with the current debate over
same-sex marriage, the evolved perspective of women as equal
partners to men did not come without criticism.
On the
changing role of women in society, one historian lamented in the
1950s that "the fundamental nature and purpose of marriage
have been lost in a struggle for equality and social justice in
isolation from the biological and domestic context in which, in

130. Id. at 948
131. Id. at 961.
132. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 96.
133. See generally E.O. JAMES, MARRIAGE AND SOCIETY (John de Graff 1955) for a
historical analysis of marriage in different cultures and times pre-1955.
134. Haslett, supra note 124, at 76.
135. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873).
136. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
137. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a
Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 263, 269 (Winter 1997).
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its natural setting, the institution occurs."'3 8 According to
Justice Ginsburg, the Court moved away from this narrow
interpretation of the female role and toward gender equality in
response to a changed social climate. 139 Similarly, the Court
should recognize the growing number of same-sex couples and
140
their ability to engage in marital relationships.
The religious argument that marriage by definition can only
embody opposite-sex couples because it is an institution with
ancient Judeo-Christian roots that rejects homosexuality also
fails.' 4 ' As Arthur S. Leonard notes:
Genesis is the product of a particular ancient culture that is just
one of many ancient world cultures, all of whose diverse
descendants are now participants in the multicultural
phenomenon

that is modern American

society .

.

. . Our

contemporary American society was born out of a rejection of
established churches and an insistence under our constitutional
structure that there be a secular justification for every legal rule,
reflecting an early recognition of religious and cultural diversity in
a new nation whose residents were
drawn from a multitude of
42
cultural and religious heritages. 1
Regardless of whether marriage has religious roots, modern
civil marriage is a non-religious institution granted by the states
to Americans of all religious persuasions. Civil marriage is an
institution created to serve society's needs. 143 States encourage
marriage because of the presumption that society benefits from
having couples promise to care for each other. 144 In return for
this presumed societal benefit, the government provides married
couples with a wide range of rights and benefits. 145 In cases
such as Turner, the Court has acknowledged the importance of
marriage for reasons unrelated to traditional notions of
procreative marriage. Because lesbians and gays share with
heterosexuals the human ability to love and care for a partner
and children, it necessarily follows that the definition of
marriage can and should apply to same-sex couples.
138. JAMES, supra note 133, at 187.
139. Ginsburg, supra note 137, at 268.
140. The census shows that same-sex couples have been increasing since 1990
everywhere in the United States. Arthur S. Leonard, Reply to "Marriageby Design," in
MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 92 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003).
141. Id. at 91.
142. Id.
143. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88, at 92.
144. See Id. at 66 (Listing the legal rights and benefits the government grants
married couples).
145. Id.
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Modern marriage is an institution embodying elements of
humanity attainable by lesbian and gay couples. In view of the
Court's recognition of this fact, same-sex couples have a
compelling constitutional claim that state laws denying them
the fundamental right to marry are unconstitutional.
As
discussed next, the Lawrence ruling and its focus on a
fundamental
liberty right to create consensual adult
146
relationships furthers this argument.
V. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
In 1986, the Court upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing
sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.147 In that case, the State
convicted Michael Hardwick of violating the sodomy statute
after a police officer looked through Hardwick's bedroom door
48
and saw him engaged in oral sex with a male companion.
Despite the fact that the sodomy statute applied to heterosexual
and homosexual couples alike, Justice White took the
opportunity
to
condone
discriminatory
treatment
of
homosexuals. According to Professor Laurence Tribe, Justice
White "recast the claim into something it had never been-an
asserted 'fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy'and that, having thus recast the claim, proceeded to dismiss it
as 'at best, facetious." ' 149 Instead of addressing whether the
government has any business legislating against consensual oral
sex between adults in a private home, Justice White focused his
opinion on dismissing a substantive due process argument for
protecting homosexual activity. 50 Importantly, the Bowers
decision relied upon a historical and moral argument that
proscriptions against homosexual conduct have "ancient roots"
based on a belief that such behavior is immoral.151
Seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
overruled Bowers in a ruling joined by six of the justices. 52 The
facts of Lawrence are similar to Bowers in that police arrested
two men, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, for
violating a sodomy statute after seeing the respondents engaged

146.
147.
148.
149.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Tribe, supra note 81, at 1952.
Id. at 1953.

151.
152.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-68 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192).
Id. at 561, 578.
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in consensual sexual activity in Lawrence's bedroom. 153 The
State prosecuted the men under a Texas statute that
criminalized sexual contact with a person of the same sex. 154
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy declared that "Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today,"
and "now is overruled." 155 The Court thus held in Lawrence that
the government may not criminalize homosexual activity.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she
argued for the same result, but under the Equal Protection
Clause. 156 Justice Scalia argued in a dissent joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas that the majority opinion
opened the door to same-sex marriage.1 57 Additionally, Justice
Thomas wrote a separate, short dissent calling the Texas law
"uncommonly silly," but noted that the Texas Legislature must
1 58
repeal the law, not the Court.
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy applied a
libertarian approach, revolutionizing substantive due process
analysis. 159 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
mandates that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. ' 160 Traditional
substantive due process analysis upholds a claimed liberty
interest not expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution
if the Court determines the right is sufficiently important to be
regarded as fundamental. 161 For the last several decades, this
approach has more or less confined the implementation of

153.
Police officers were "dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported
weapons disturbance. . . . The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been
questioned." Id. at 562-63, 566. See also Tribe, supra note 81, at 1952 (facts concerning
Bowers).
154.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) provided: "A person commits an

offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex."
The
statute
defines
"[d]eviate
sexual
intercourse"
as
follows:
(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person; or
(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.
Id. § 21.01(1). See also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
155. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
156. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479).
159.

MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE

OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 170 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2005). See also Tribe, supra note 81
at 1898.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (emphasis added).
161.
Chemerinsky, supra note 26 at 763.
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substantive due process to an exercise of listing fundamental
rights such as speaking, praying, raising children, and using
162
contraceptives in the privacy of the marital bedroom.
Determining a fundamental right using this due process
approach has never been a vision of clarity for the Court.
Justice Harlan described due process not as a formula, but
rather a balancing act between "respect for the liberty of the
individual" and "demands of organized society," while
163
simultaneously taking into account historical traditions.
Thus, while liberty is an integral aspect of substantive due
process analysis, the Court also gives government ample
consideration.
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy reconfigured traditional
substantive due process analysis by shifting the role of liberty to
the center and placing a greater burden on the government to
justify interference with an individual's liberty. According to
Justice Kennedy's opinion, an individual has the right to control
a personal relationship provided it does not involve minors,
persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might not
164
In
easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution.
other words, as a general rule, neither the State nor a court
should define the meaning of a relationship, nor should they set
boundaries unless there would otherwise be "injury to a person
165
or abuse of an institution the law protects."'
Lawrence further holds that liberty and dignity apply
equally to individuals in terms of how they relate to, and
interact with, one another. 166 "Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct."' 67 Accordingly, the fundamental right protected by
substantive due process is "liberty" in of itself, and not, as held
in earlier decisions, extracted notions such as privacy, family
autonomy or marriage. 168 Professor Tribe asserts that Justice
Tribe, supra note 81 at 1898.
162.
163. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Tribe, supra note 81 at 1937.
164. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
165. Id. at 567.
166. Tribe, supra note 81 at 1898.
167. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
168. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 511 (1977) ("[i]f any freedom not
a.
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enjoys

a 'pLeflrlle
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most certainly the family") (citations omitted); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973)
("the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision"); and Loving, 388 US at 12
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Kennedy rejected Bower's traditional due process approach to
fundamental rights as. a "given set of data points on a twodimensional grid" 16 9 whereby states have wide reign in writing
laws grounded in morality. To this end, Justice Kennedy wrote
in Lawrence:
The condemnation [of homosexuality] has been shaped by religious
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect
for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial
concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical
and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of our lives. These considerations do not
answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on
'Our
the whole society through operation of criminal law.
obligation is170to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code.'

Quoting Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers, the Court noted
history's limitations in constitutional decision-making:
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation [in Loving]
from constitutional attack.171

Lawrence thus overruled Bowers by holding that a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause extends to gay and
lesbian relationships, while concluding that the moral and
historical arguments on which Bowers was based did not
72
sufficiently withstand constitutional analysis.
Notably, Justice O'Connor joined the 1986 Bowers decision
and did not agree with overruling it.173 She thus agreed with
the judgment in Lawrence, but wrote a concurring opinion
relying on the Equal Protection Clause. 174 Justice O'Connor
distinguished Lawrence from Bowers by differentiating the
statutory language at issue in both cases. The Georgia statute
in Bowers applied to heterosexual couples engaged in sodomy, as

("[tihe freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
169. Tribe, supra note 81 at 1898-99. See id. at 1936-37 for a further discussion on
the idea of "data points."
170. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
171. Id. at 577-78.

172.

Id.

173.
174.

Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)
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well as homosexuals engaged in such conduct. 175 In Justice
O'Connor's opinion, the Texas law at issue in Lawrence failed
rational basis review because it "treat[ed] the same conduct
differently based solely on the participants."'176 Justice O'Connor
concluded that Texas's attempt to justify its statute by arguing
that it promoted morality misconstrued the Bowers holding:
Bowers did not hold that that moral disapproval of a group is a
rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause to criminalize
homosexual sodomy when heterosexual sodomy is not punished.
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state
interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy,
but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a
to justify a
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause
177
law that discriminates among groups of persons.
As Professor Tribe notes, the Lawrence "decision's
unmistakable heart is an understanding that liberty is centered
in equal respect and dignity for both conventional and
unconventional human relationships."' 178 The dignity, freedom
and liberty of which Justice Kennedy recognized, extends
beyond privacy and sexual relations, or any other list of
unconnected individual rights. 79 Accordingly, lesbian and gay
adults have the right to foster consenting relationships. "The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to make this choice" to engage in sexual practices
common to the lesbian or gay lifestyle without criminal
punishment. 8 0
Lawrence thus establishes a long overdue
precedent that adults may choose to engage in same-sex
8
relationships without losing their dignity as free persons.' '
The majority opinion did not address same-sex marriage,
but Justice O'Connor mentioned it in her concurring opinion,

175. Id. at 566.
176. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor notes
that a "more searching form of rational basis review" applies under equal protection
analysis when a law harms a politically unpopular group, as evidenced by Romer. Id. at
580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
178. Tribe, supra note 81 at 1955.
179. Id.

180.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.

181.

Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2005

25

430

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Montana Law Review, Vol. 66 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Vol. 66

asserting that "[u]nlike the moral disapproval of same-sex
relations . . . other reasons exist to promote the institution of
marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded
group. ' 182
While Justice O'Connor references same-sex
marriage, she does not argue that Lawrence analyzes the issue
or indicates a specific result. Justice Scalia, on the other hand,
strongly argued in his dissent that the majority's reasoning
unquestionably opened the door to same-sex marriage:
Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that
has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is
concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is no
legitimate state interest for purposes of proscribing that conduct;
and if . . . sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a
personal bond that is more enduring,' what justification could
there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
8 3
couples exercising the liberty protected by the Constitution?1

Thus, while Justice Scalia angrily dissented from the
majority's reasoning, he openly conceded the Lawrence
reasoning provides a strong liberty argument for permitting
same-sex marriage. 8 4 In view of Lawrence, combined with the
Court's earlier Romer decision where it recognized the equal
rights of lesbians and gays, Justice Scalia's dissenting thoughts
on the inevitability of marriage are unsurprising.
VI. ROMER V. EVANS

In the 1996 case Romer v. Evans, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution,
adopted in a 1992 statewide referendum.18 5 The Supreme Court
ultimately held the amendment unconstitutional because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
86
Amendment.
In Romer, Colorado voters adopted "Amendment 2" to their

182. Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring). While the majority opinion did not
explicitly discuss marriage, Justice Kennedy wrote that liberty "as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects." Id. at 567. See also text accompanying supra note 165.
183. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citations and quotations omitted).
184. Tribe, supra note 81 at 1945.
185. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
186. Id.
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constitution by statewide referendum.1 8 7 This amendment
precluded all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level
of state or local government designed to protect the status of
persons based on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.18 8 The citizens
enacted Amendment 2 in response to local ordinances in Aspen,
Boulder and Denver that banned discrimination in many
transactions and activities, including housing, employment,
education, public accommodations, and health and welfare
These local ordinances were consistent with
services.1 8 9
traditional statutory protections provided by state legislatures
to counter discrimination. 190 The laws specified both the persons
or entities precluded from discriminating and the groups or
persons protected. 19 ' Colorado's local governments extended
antidiscrimination laws to an extensive list of classes beyond
sexual orientation, including, for example: age, military status,
marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor child,
political affiliation, and physical or mental disability of an
To the extent these ordinances prohibited
individual. 192
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, Amendment 2
repealed them. 93 This meant that lesbians, gays and bisexuals
could no longer seek protection under antidiscrimination
ordinances. In essence, Amendment 2 nullified specific legal
protections for lesbians, gays and bisexuals in all transactions
related to housing, sale of real estate insurance, health and
welfare services, private education, and employment. 194 Not
limited to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also effectively
repealed or forbade all laws and policies operating to protect
gays and lesbians from discrimination on every level of Colorado

187. COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b, enjoined by Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("[n]either the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt of enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination").
188. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
189. Id. at 623-24.
190. Id. at 628.
191. Id.
192.
id. at 628-29.
193. Id. at 624.
194. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
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government. 195
Perhaps most troublesome, Amendment 2
created circumstances whereby lesbians, gays and bisexuals
could only receive protection against discrimination similar to
everyone else by enlisting the Colorado citizenry to amend the
196
state constitution again.
In overturning the amendment, the Colorado Supreme
Court applied the United States Supreme Court's voting rights
cases and held that under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Colorado's Amendment 2 infringed the fundamental rights of
gays and lesbians to participate in the political process. 197 The
United State Supreme Court reached the same result in
affirming the ruling, but based its decision on equal protection
grounds, instead of voting rights. 198
The majority opinion,
written by Justice Kennedy, began with a quote from the first
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the notorious
opinion affirming racial segregation released almost one
hundred years to the day before Romer: 99 "One century ago, the
first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.' Unheeded then, those words now are understood to
state a commitment to the law's neutrality where the rights of
persons are at stake. 2 0
The Court then held that the Equal Protection Clause
enforces this principle, rendering Colorado's Amendment 2
20
invalid. '
In explaining equal protection analysis, Justice Kennedy,
noted that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the Court will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end. 20 2 "By requiring that the classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate
legislative end," Justice Kennedy wrote, "we ensure that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging
the group burdened by the law. ' 20 3 The rational basis test

195. Id. at 629.
196. Id. at 631.
197. Id. at 625.
198. Id. at 623, 626.
199. TUSHNET, supra note 159 at 167.
200. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (internal citation omitted).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 633.
203. Id.
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requires a link between the classification and the legislation's
objective. 20 4 This link provides guidance and discipline for the
legislature to know what sorts of laws it can pass and marks the
limits of its authority. 205 In the ordinary case, a law will be
sustained if it advances a legitimate government interest, even
if the law seems unwise or disadvantages a particular group, or
if the rationale seems tenuous. 20 6 In Romer, the Court held that
"Amendment 2 fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even this conventional
20 7
inquiry."
Colorado argued that its citizens, in particular landlords
and employers, had the right to freely associate and, therefore,
discriminate against homosexuals based on moral or religious
grounds. 20 8 The State further argued that the provision put
lesbians, gays and bisexuals in the same position as all other
persons; in other words, it denied them no more than "special
rights."20 9 The Court disagreed, concluding that the local
ordinances did not create special protections for gays and
lesbians: "It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad
language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians
even of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit
arbitrary
discrimination in governmental
and private
settings." 210 Essentially, Amendment 2 destroyed the equal
application of antidiscrimination laws by specifically excluding
lesbians, gays and bisexuals from receiving general protections
ensured by local ordinances. The Court stated that Amendment
2 imposed "a special disability" upon lesbians, gays and
bisexuals alone by forbidding them "the safeguards that others
21 1
enjoy or may seek without constraint."
Amendment 2 failed the rational basis test because the
broad and undifferentiated disability imposed on homosexuals
lacked a legitimate connection to the reasons offered for the
law. 212
The Court found no precedent for the amendment's
identifying persons by a single trait and then denying them

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 632.

211.
212.

Id. at 631.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33.

Id.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 626.
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protection enjoyed by all other citizens. 213
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms
to all who seek its assistance. Equal protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.
Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain
class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships
are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the
214
most literal sense.

Ultimately, the Court held that Colorado failed to provide a
legitimate public policy reason for Amendment 2.215 Because the
language of Amendment 2 did nothing to further the reasons
offered by the State for its implementation, the Court did not
accept Colorado's argument that Amendment 2 guaranteed
other citizens' freedom of association and liberty interests, and
conserved resources to fight discrimination against other
groups. 216 Instead, the Court concluded that Colorado enacted
Amendment 2, not to further a proper legislative end, but to
further the inequality experienced by lesbians and gays out of
pure animus. 21 7 In essence, Romer stands for the proposition
that lesbians and gays have the same constitutional rights as
other citizens.
VII. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MONTANA'S
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
Article XIII, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of
Montana now provides: "Only a marriage between one man and
one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this
2 18

state."

At the time the Marriage Amendment went into effect,
Montana already had a statutory prohibition on same-sex
marriage in its code. 219
Like Massachusetts's statutory
prohibition, however, advocates for same-sex marriage in

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 632, 635.
MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(d) (2003).
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Montana had a viable constitutional challenge to this statute
based on its state constitution. 220 For this reason, opponents of
same-sex marriage petitioned to place CI-96 on the November
2004 ballot. 221 The Marriage Amendment succeeds in making it
far more difficult to challenge the constitutionality of Montana's
prohibition on same-sex marriage on state constitutional
grounds. 222 The amendment, however, does not preclude a
challenge under the United States Constitution. As evidenced
by the federal cases analyzed in this comment, Montana's
Marriage Amendment violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Over the years, the Court has deemed some liberty interests
not expressly written into the Constitution-such as marriage,
activitysexual
and
procreation,
autonomy,
family
"fundamental rights" protected under due process analysis, and
in many cases, also equal protection. 223 Under due process
analysis, the Court generally applies strict scrutiny and asks
whether the government has a compelling state interest for
taking away the liberty interest in question. 224 In applying
equal protection, the Court identifies the classification, decides
the applicable level of scrutiny-strict, intermediate or rational
basis review-and asks whether the law in question meets the
level of scrutiny. 225 Challenging a law under the rational basis
test can be difficult, as the Court tends to be highly deferential
to the government under this lowest level of scrutiny. 226 Even
so, the Court held in Romer that "equal protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.
Respect for this principle explains why laws singling out a
certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general
hardships are rare."227 In applying equal protection analysis to
lesbians and gays, the Romer Court utilized "a more searching
form of rational basis review" and held that the government
failed to further a proper legislative end in denying equal
220. For example, Montana's statutory prohibition could have been challenged
under the equal protection and dignity clauses of Article II, section 4 of Montana's
Constitution, which states: "The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
221. Carson, supranote 24.
222. Supra note 3.
223. Chemerinsky,supra note 26 at 762.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 644-48.
226. Id. at 646.
227. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
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I..
protection to lesbians and gays.2 28
As discussed previously, Loving, Boddie, Zablocki and
Turner provide that marriage is a fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court assigns marriage
fundamental right status, not for religious or procreative
reasons, but for the stability, emotional support, and the public
commitment it provides.
Modern companionate marriage
entails elements fully attainable by sAme-sex couples.
Therefore, Montana cannot deprive lesbians and gays the
fundamental right to marry unless it can satisfy, under strict
scrutiny, its burden of showing a compelling state interest
overriding the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians. Even
without applying strict scrutiny under fundamental right
analysis, Lawrence and Romer evidence that lesbians and gays
have the same rights as heterosexuals. Consequently, Montana
cannot deny lesbians and gays legal marriage unless a link
exists between this prohibition and a legitimate state interest.
While the government has not articulated any state interests
allegedly supporting the Marriage Amendment, a number of
reasons were listed by the CI-96 proponents in the 2004 Voter
Information Pamphlet in support of prohibiting lesbians and
229
gays from marrying.

228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
229. The "Argument for CI-96" in the 2004 Voter Information Pamphlet reads as
follows:
The time-honored, vital institution of marriage is being threatened.
Homosexual activists have pushed legislatures in Montana and across the U.S.
to legalize same-sex marriage. Legislators have repeatedly said no because
voters, by an overwhelming majority, reject same-sex marriage. Lack of
legislative success has caused homosexual activists to change tactics. They now
seek out activist judges who are willing to mandate same-sex marriage by
judicial decree. Public policy should be decided by the people, either directly
through ballot initiative, or indirectly through their elected representatives,
not by activist judges. Voting yes on CI-96 places the definition of marriage in
the hands of the people, rather than the courts. CI-96 will ensure that natural
marriage is preserved by defining it constitutionally. Special interest groups
are constantly seeking to gain special rights that infringe on the rights of the
rest of society. Such special rights cost all Montanans both in dollars and in
lost freedom. For instance, in this case, we could lose the freedom to teach our
children as we wish. The issue of same-sex marriage will come before
Montana's courts soon. Voting yes on CI-96 allows the people to give clear
direction to judges on this important issue. Voters have never legalized samesex marriage in any state. In every instance where same-sex marriage was
mandated by a court decision, the voters immediately overturned the court
through ballot initiative, and then amended their state constitutions to define
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. If CI-96 fails, how will
homosexual marriage one day affect your family?
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First and foremost, proponents of the Marriage Amendment
stated that the people of Montana should create public policy,
The argument for CI-96 employed
not the courts. 230
inflammatory scare tactics, stating that lesbians and gays are
"seeking to gain special rights that infringe on the rest of
society," and warned voters that same-sex marriage will "cost all
23 1
of Montanans both in dollars and in lost freedom.
Proponents listed myriad predictions for how same-sex marriage
would affect Montana families: (1) Montana public schools would
have to change their curriculum to teach that same-sex couples
are normal; (2) business owners would lose money from having
to pay benefits to employees' same-sex spouses; (3) churches
would be forced to provide religious ceremonies to same-sex
couples; and (4) "natural marriage" provides for future
In summation,
generations and better serves children.2 32
in
their
rebuttal:
proponents argued
This amendment insures that parents will be 'let alone' to raise
their children as they deem best. It insures churches will be 'let
alone' to practice their faith as they feel led, and it insures

- Every public school in Montana would be required to teach your children that
same-sex marriage and homosexuality are perfectly normal. Pictures in
textbooks will also be changed to show same-sex marriage as normal.
- Small business employers in Montana may someday be required to provide
expanded health coverage, retirement and fringe benefits to same-sex
"spouses" of employees. The broad subjectivity of such un-funded mandates
could hurt Montana's economy and jobs.
Your church will be legally pressured to perform same-sex weddings. When
courts - as happened in Massachusetts - find same-sex marriage to be a
"constitutional and fundamental human right," homosexual activists will
successfully argue that government is underwriting discrimination by offering
tax exemptions to churches and synagogues that only honor natural marriage.
Natural marriage is extremely important for future generations. Men and
women are distinctly different. Each gender brings vitally important, and
unique, elements to a child's development. Saying that children don't
necessarily need fathers or mothers is saying that one gender or the other is
unnecessary. A loving and compassionate society always aids motherless and
fatherless families. Compassionate societies never intentionally create families
without mothers or fathers, which is exactly what same-sex homes do.
Of 193 countries, only Scandinavia and two other countries have legalized
same-sex marriage. This radical departure from thousands of years of timetested natural marriage has only occurred within the last 10 years. Let's
protect our families and children from this vast, untested, social experiment.
Please vote FOR CI-96!
MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET (2004), available at
http://sos.state.mt.us/Assets/elections/voterinfopamphlet2004.htm.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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employers will be 'let alone' to run their businesses233in a manner
they feel best serves their employees and customers.

These reasons set forth by proponents of the Marriage
Amendment fail to even pass the lowest scrutiny test because
they do not show that banning same-sex marriage is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.
According to the first argument, allowing same-sex
marriage would require Montana public schools to change their
2 34
curriculum to teach that same-sex couples are normal.
Prohibiting same-sex marriage, of course, does not ensure that
school curriculums will be anti-gay or anti-lesbian. At the heart
of this first argument is a belief that the government approves
As
immoral conduct by legalizing same-sex marriage. 235
Professor Eskridge points out, however, the state does not have
236
a policy of checking the morality of marriage applicants.
Heterosexual couples from across the moral spectrum can file for
and receive a marriage license from the government with
minimal inconvenience. 23 7 The state does not comb through
marriage forms to discard evil, perverted, or incompetent
applicants.2 3 After all, not just ex-convicts, but prisoners too,
Regardless of popular
can obtain a marriage license. 23 9
sentiment, moral grounds are not enough to justify states
banning same-sex marriages. Many citizens disagreed with
interracial marriage when Loving held anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional. 240 But the Loving Court recognized that the
rule of law did not coincide with society's beliefs at the time and
overturned the prohibitory statutes accordingly. 24 1 The same is
The fact that a
true today regarding same-sex marriage.
majority of Montana voters apparently believe same-sex
relationships are inappropriate does not qualify as a legitimate
state interest.
Second, CI-96 proponents argued that if marriage is not
limited to heterosexual couples, business owners would lose
money from paying benefits to same-sex couples. This is an

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. (Proponent Rebuttal Argument).
Id.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 88 at 104.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
See generally Turner, 482 U.S. 78.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 88 at 109.
Id.
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ironic argument considering the emphasis proponents of the
Marriage Amendment place on encouraging heterosexual
marriage. The Montana Family Foundation, the organization
behind CI-96, includes two articles on its website that laud the
advantages of marriage. 242 One article states that "married
couples may have advantages in terms of economic resources,
social and psychological support and encouragement of healthful
lifestyles." 243 The posting of these articles on Montana Family
Foundation's website clearly infers that the organization
encourages people to enter into heterosexual marriages.
Encouraging more heterosexual marriages, of course, increases
the benefits business owners must pay to employees. This
supposed economic justification for the Marriage Amendment is
disingenuous and not a constitutionally valid rationale for the
Marriage Amendment.
Third, CI-96 proponents argued that without the Marriage
Amendment, churches would be forced to participate in
marrying same-sex couples. Specifically, their argument in the
2004 Voter Information Pamphlet stated that "church[es] will be
legally pressured to perform same-sex weddings" because
"homosexual activists will successfully argue that government is
underwriting discrimination by offering tax exemptions to
churches and synagogues that only honor natural marriage. 2 4 4
This speculation is patently unsubstantiated. In Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, the Supreme Court held: "The First
Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety or
not."245 The Court concluded that the government may not force
an organization with an express anti-gay or anti-lesbian purpose
or message to include lesbians or gays. 246 Moreover, government
interference with religious practices is stringently limited by the
First Amendment's free exercise clause. 247 As the opponent
rebuttal to CI-96 noted: "Churches retain the special right to
refuse to solemnize the marriage of any couple for any
reason."248 Legalizing same-sex marriage concerns a legal and

242. Associated Press, Married Folks More Likely to be Healthy (Dec. 15, 2004);
Associated Press, The Benefits of Marriage (March 3, 2004), available at
http://www.montanafamily.org/start.asp?file=newsindex.
243. Associated Press, MarriedFolks More Likely to be Healthy.
244.

MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 229

245.

530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000).

247.
248.

Chemerinsky, supra note 26 at 1200.
MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 229 (Opponent Rebuttal).
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civil right-not a religious ceremony, which churches controland is not based on a particular religious doctrine. 249
Fourth, CI-96 proponents argued that "[n]atural marriage is
extremely important for future generations" and the Marriage
Amendment will protect Montana "families and children from
250
this vast, untested, social experiment" of same-sex parenting.
According to the proponents' argument, men and women are
different, with differences vitally important to a child's
development. 25 1
This assertion is problematic for several
reasons. First, it implies that the Marriage Amendment is
necessarily linked to stopping lesbians and gays from becoming
parents. Lesbians -and gays, however, already are parents. 252
Second, this argument
implies that the amendment
affirmatively helps children. Yet, the Marriage Amendment
fails to mention children or any affirmative measures to improve
children's lives.
The Census Bureau reported in 2000 that twelve hundred
Montana households identified themselves as headed by lesbian
or gay couples. 253 This figure marks a 326% increase since
1990.254
Importantly, many of these couples are parents of
children either through a prior relationship, adoption, or
reproductive technology. 255 The Marriage Amendment fails to
improve the lives of these Montana families.
Instead, the
amendment hurts them by denying lesbian and gay couples the
social and financial benefits associated with legal marriage.
Lesbian and gay Montana families have the same burdens of
maintaining a joint household as heterosexual families. 256 The
government grants numerous benefits to married couples
because it presumes society benefits from people vowing to care
for each other and their families. 257 As the Goodridge court
noted, these benefits "are enormous, touching nearly every

249. Discrimination Written into Montana's Constitution (Montana Human Rights
Network) Nov. 2004 at 6, availableat http://www.mhrn.org/website.pdf.
250.

MONTANA SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 229

251. Id.
252. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88 at 110.
253. Brief of Amici Curiae MEA-MFT at 5-6, Snetsinger v. University of Montana,
2004 MT 390, 325 Mont. 148, 104 P.3d 445. Twelve hundred households equals roughly
0.6% of the total married or unmarried coupled households in Montana. Id. (citing U.S.
CENSUS BUREAu, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000, Table PCT22).

254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. This figure is believed to be higher than reported. Id. at 6, n.4.
Id. at 6.
Id.
ESKRIDGE, supranote 88 at 66-67.
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aspect of life and death. '258 Lesbian and gay families exist in
Montana and deserve the same social and legal protections,
benefits, and obligations accorded heterosexual households in
259
the State.
The argument that "natural marriage" serves children
better because "[e]ach gender brings vitally important, and
unique, elements to a child's development" is based on
unsubstantiated assumptions about the benefits of heterosexual
parenting. 260 In fact, the American Academy of Pediatricians,
the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychoanalytic Association, and the American Academy of Child
and Adolescent Psychiatrists all support the ability of lesbians
All of these reputable
and gays to raise children. 261
organizations have participated in friend-of-the-court briefs and
have written position papers arguing that studies support the
proposition that lesbians and gays are capable parents. 262 An
American Psychological Association study concluded that "[t]he
results of existing research comparing gay and lesbian parents
to heterosexual parents and children of gay or lesbian parents to
children of heterosexual parents are quite uniform: common
stereotypes are not supported by the data. '263 The Goodridge
court concluded that confining marriage to opposite-sex couples
does not ensure that children are raised in the "optimal" setting:
"Protecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy.
Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, however, cannot
264
plausibly further this policy."
Finally, CI-96 proponents argued, "Special interest groups
are constantly seeking to gain special rights that infringe on the
rights of the rest of society." 265 As was the case regarding
Colorado's "special rights" argument in Romer, this reasoning is

258. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
259. Importantly, Professor Nancy D. Polikoff argues that all families deserve the
governmental benefits accorded heterosexual married couples, no matter the family
form. See generally Polikoff, supra note 127. While I agree with Professor Polikoff's
contention, this comment focuses exclusively on the discrimination at issue in the
marriage laws.
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patently implausible. 2 6 Allowing same-sex couples to marry
does not create "special rights" for lesbians and gays. To the
contrary, and similar to the Court's holding in Romer,
permitting same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses simply
allows for legal benefits that heterosexual couples take for
granted. 267 Montanans face no harm whatsoever if lesbians and
gays obtain marriage licenses. To the contrary, permitting
same-sex couples to marry would improve the lives of Montana
lesbian and gay families by providing essential government
benefits. The Marriage Amendment fails to address the real
issues facing families today, such as divorce rates, domestic
violence and economic issues. 268 It fails to address these issues
because the purpose behind CI-96 was never to help families,
269
but rather to hold one family form as superior to another.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This comment argues that Montana's Marriage Amendment
is unconstitutional because it violates both due process and
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court held in Loving,
Boddie, Zablocki, and Turner that the state cannot infringe on
the fundamental right to marry unless it presents compelling
governmental interests. Even prisoners, the Court held in
Turner, have a right to marry because of the social and economic
benefits the institution provides a couple. 270 The Court reached
this conclusion by finding that marriage expresses a couple's
emotional support and public commitment that may be religious
or spiritual, and provides myriad governmental, property and
other, less tangible benefits. 271 This reasoning presented by the
Court has nothing to do with heterosexuality. Marriage is
fundamental to society and individuals for reasons entirely
attainable by lesbian and gay couples.
"Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct," Justice Kennedy wrote in Lawrence.272 This means
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that lesbians and gays have the same liberty interest to enter
into intimate relationships with members of their own sex as
heterosexuals have with the opposite sex. Moreover, Romer
holds that the state cannot prohibit lesbians and gays from
experiencing their constitutional rights unless a link exists
273
between the prohibition and a legitimate state interest.
Denying same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry
requires the state to show a compelling governmental interest,
but Montana fails to even pass the less strict Romer test-no
link exists between prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
and furthering legitimate state goals.
Today, Montana is one of seventeen states* with a
amendment effectively banning same-sex
constitutional
of
marriage. In the fifteen years prior to Loving, it was one 274
marriage.
interracial
on
ban
its
repeal
to
fourteen states
Montana should follow suit with regard to its Marriage
Amendment. Similar to anti-miscegenation laws, the Marriage
Amendment discriminates against same-sex couples because
they do not look like the traditional marriage model. The
"natural marriage" argument that same-sex marriage is a
"radical departure from thousands of years of time-tested
natural marriage," 275 resembles the Loving trial judge's
commentary that God placed the races on separate continents
"[a]nd but for the interference with his arrangement there would
be no cause for such marriages." 276 Like the people involved in
interracial and heterosexual relationships, lesbians and gays are
human beings with the capacity to love, nurture, and maintain
loyal, committed unions. Just as anti-miscegenation laws are
now viewed as unfortunate relics of a bigoted past, so too, I
If
predict, same-sex marriage will one day be regarded.
as
Virginia
Amendment,
its
Marriage
to
repeal
fails
Montana
failed to repeal its ban on interracial marriage, due process and
equal protection should prevail under the Fourteenth
Amendment to grant Montana's lesbian and gay couples access
to this fundamental right and all the social and economic
benefits that it provides.
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